Outcome of the Copenhagen Conference Summit on Climate Change (COP 15)

Tabled by Rebecca Harms, Satu Hassi, Bas Eickhout and Yannick Jadot
on behalf of the Greens/EFA Group

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions relating to climate change, and in particular the one adopted 25 November b on EU strategy for Copenhagen Climate Conference,

– having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure

A. Whereas the main outcome of the Copenhagen Conference is the "Copenhagen Accord", which was taken note of by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC;

B. Whereas the Accord was negotiated between 27 Heads of State and Government, responsible for more than 80 % of the global CO2 emissions and representing all major regional groups,

C. Whereas the Accord is far from meeting the objectives set in the European Parliament resolution adopted 25 November 2009;

D. Whereas the Accord is not legally binding and does not explicitly foresee the conclusion of a legally binding agreement in 2010;

E. Whereas the Accord does not set global mid-term or long term reduction targets, nor state when the global emissions would need to peak;

F. Whereas the voluntary reduction commitment pledges that are announced by Parties to the Accord do not add up to what is required by science in order to stay within the 2° objective; whereas pledges from all industrialised countries apart from Japan and Norway are inadequate and EU target is falling far behind; whereas some developing countries, like Brazil and Mexico have committed to relatively more ambitious measures;

G. Whereas the Accord recognises the need to limit global temperatures rising no more than 2° and includes a reference to exploring pathways to remain below a 1.5° Celsius global temperature increase.

H. Whereas, the Accord found an agreement regarding measuring, reporting and verification of developing country mitigation actions through national communications, which will be subject to international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines still to be defined that will need ensure that sovereignty is respected;

I. Whereas the Accord provides the basis for significant financing for climate action, in a balanced manner both for mitigation and adaptation, including fast-start funding (US$ 30 billion) for 2010-2012 and long-term finance (US$ 100 billion per year in 2020), and for the establishment of institutional structures for managing this financing, including a Copenhagen Green Fund and a High Level Panel;

J. Whereas much of the money promised so far for climate efforts in developing countries is diverting Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds from development assistance, therefore posing a serious threat to poverty reduction and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),

K. Whereas the Accord provides the basis for setting up a mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhancing removals of greenhouse gas emissions by forests, the establishment of a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer, and contains a reference to the role of markets to enhance the cost-effectiveness of mitigation actions; whereas effective implementation of such mechanisms requires agreement in the UNFCCC framework;

L. Whereas the Conference of Parties extended the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working Groups under Kyoto Protocol and the Framework Convention (Long Term Cooperative Action) until COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico in December 2010; whereas many countries including the BASIC countries have expressed their commitment to these processes

Way ahead from Copenhagen

1. Expresses its profound disappointment at the failure to reach a global comprehensive post 2012 climate agreement in Copenhagen, putting the aim of averting dangerous climate change at risk and raising the cost of climate action;

2. Considers that delay in finding international agreement is not a justification to postpone further EU policies to achieve reductions that are known to be necessary based on science; calls therefore for EU to step up its domestic reduction target to 30% and to clarify the conditions for moving to a 40% reduction target; calls the EU to achieve these targets through energy savings and renewable energy sources, and to refuse false solutions such as nuclear energy and so-called "clean coal"; calls for an ambitious and binding energy savings target to be agreed as soon as possible;

3. Regrets that the EU was not able, through specific commitments to international public finance for climate efforts in developing countries at an earlier stage, to build confidence in the negotiations in order to make further progress in under the Ad Hoc Working Groups; furthermore calls on the EU to be clear that it is willing to continue with a second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol provided that the US has legally binding commitments under another legal instrument and that surplus AAUs and LULUCF rules do not undermine its environmental integrity;

4. Urges the EU to double the efforts to develop an external climate policy and to speak with one voice to regain a leading role in the negotiations towards a binding, comprehensive post-2012 agreement in line with the latest developments in science and consistent with the 2ºC objective at COP 16, in Mexico December 2010;

5. Calls in particular for stronger engagement with Mexico, Brazil and South-Africa;

6. Remains committed to the negotiations under the UN frameworkand calls Heads of States to not undermine this process but rather work at reinforcing it especially by avoiding exclusive approaches, calls however for urgent consideration of ways to make the process more efficient, and in that context for the EU to make proposals for applying voting rules, based on significant majorities regarding several criteria, if appropriate, to facilitate progress in the negotiations;

7. Recognises that a participatory, fair and transparent process is necessary to maintain legitimacy to a future climate agreement which is of fundamental importance for the future of the planet; believes that drafting in representative smaller groups is necessary but needs to be based on the objectives and mandates agreed by all;

8. Considers that forums such as G20 or Major Economies Forum can help forge consensus in the formal negotiations, but can only have an auxiliary role as they do not lend themselves to binding outcomes and do not represent the poorest and the most vulnerable countries to climate change;

9. Calls for Parties to make significant progress in Bonn meetings in May-June 2010 and schedule high level sessions before Mexico to facilitate progress in time for the COP-16;

Reduction commitments

10. Stresses that the international agreement should be based on the principle of a 'common but differentiated responsibility', with the industrialised countries taking the lead in reducing their domestic emissions with economy-wide binding targets and emerging countries, in accordance with the Bali Action Plan, take nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development; believes that the future agreement provide for sanctions at international level for non-compliance;

11. Recalls that the international agreement should ensure collective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the developed countries at the high end of the 25-40 % range for 2020 compared to 1990 levels, as recommended by the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 4AR), and that recent scientific data indicates that an emission reduction of at least 40 % is required; calls for those reductions to be domestic;

12. Recalls that a long-term reduction target should be set for the EU and the other developed countries of at least 80 -95 % by 2050 compared to 1990 levels, and that global greenhouse gas emissions should start falling by 2015 at the latest;

13. Call for regular reviews in the agreement after each new IPCC report, and in any case no more than every 5 years every five years to make sure that the reduction targets are ambitious enough to meet the 2°C objective and that those targets continue to be in line with the latest developments in science;

14. Calls for the environmental effectiveness of Annex I emissions reduction targets to be the guiding principle as regards the EU approach to international accounting rules for forest management and LULUCF, flexible mechanisms,as well as any banking of overachievement under first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol towards post 2012 targets;calls for a comprehensive review of carbon markets regarding their ability to deal with climate change;

15. Emphasises that any future REDD scheme must respect the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, including their right to collective property and to autonomous indigenous territories, and provide for their full and effective participation and decision-making power at all levels, including in the development and implementation of national REDD plans, and allocation or distribution of financing;

16. Regrets the lack of progress in tackling global aviation and maritime emissions; calls on the EU to ensure that full climate impact of aviation is taken into account and that the reduction targets for the aviation and maritime sectors are the same as other industry sectors in the future agreement;

Financing

17. Stresses the historical responsibility of developed countries for irreversible climate change and their responsibility to provide sufficient, sustainable and predictable financial and technical support to the developing countries to allow them to commit themselves to the reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions, to adapt to the consequences of climate change and to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, as well as to enhance capacity-building in order to comply with obligations under the future international agreement on climate change;

18. Insists that such commitments to provide for the required predictable financial support for climate change mitigation and adaptation in the context of the UNFCCC must be new and additional to ODA and independent from annual budgetary procedures in the Member States; recalls the already-existing commitments aimed at achieving ODA levels of 0,7 % of GDP by 2015;

19. Without prejudging different international instruments for creating revenue for financing climate action in developing countries (tax on financial transactions, international bunker fuel tax, etc) considers that at least an annual € 120 bn international public financing will be needed; highlights that in order to avoid double-counting the carbon market can not be considered as providing finance support to developing countries;

20. Stresses the need for the 'fast-start' support pledged by the EU Member States to be new and additional to ODA budgets, coordinated at the EU level and made available as soon as possible and in any case before Mexico COP 16 to finance action in developing countries; considers this to be key factor for building confidence for success in Mexico andcalls for the Commission to regularly report, from june 2010, not only on the use of the pledged fast start funding but also on its additionality to existing ODA;

21. Recalls that the collective contribution by the EU towards developing countries' mitigation efforts and adaptation needs should not be less than EUR 30 000 million per annum by 2020, a figure that may increase as new knowledge is acquired concerning the severity of climate change and the scale of its costs;

22. Underlines that a substantial part of the revenues generated by the auctioning of certificates in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), as well as for any international mechanism for aviation and maritime transport, should be earmarked for enabling developing countries to fight and adapt to climate change;

23. Emphasises that the upcoming EU budget review needs to focus on providing sufficient resources for measures for protection against, and adaptation to, climate change, both within EU and in developing countries;

24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU contracting parties.