Iran and its nuclear programme

The European Parliament,

- having regard to Security Council Resolutions 1696 and 1737(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 and 1835 (2008) and 1929(2010), 

- having regard to the Conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 23 January 2012-01-24t announcing additional restrictive measures against Iran in the energy sector, including a phased embargo of Iranian crude oil imports to the EU, in the financial sector, including against the Central Bank of <place w:st="on"></place><country-region w:st="on"></country-region>Iran</country-region><//country-region></place><//place>, in the transport sector as well as further export restrictions, notably on gold and on sensitive dual-use goods and technology, as well as additional designations of persons and entities, including several controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

- having regard to the statement by the EU High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission Catherine Ashton on behalf of E3+3 "following the talks with Iran in Istanbul, 21 and 22 January 2011" and of 20 January 2012 on "speculation about the possibility of an imminent resumption of talks between the E3/EU+3 and Iran"

- having regard to letter by the High Representative Ashton to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran Saeed Jalili  of 21 October 2011 and her statement on Iran of 18 November 2011,

- having regard to the IAEA report to the Board of Governors on Implementation of the NPY Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 8 November 2011

- having regard to its former resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran and notably the ones of 10 February 2010 and of 10 March 2011

- having regard to its recommendation to the Council on a consistent policy towards regimes against which the EU applies restrictive measures, when their leaders exercise their personal and commercial interests within EU borders

- having regard to the UN Conference on a Weapon of Mass Destruction- free <place w:st="on"></place>Middle East</place><//place> in the Fall of 2012

- having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. Whereas the November 2011 IAEA report expresses "serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme" because "some activities" "relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device" "may still be ongoing",

B. Whereas the report further takes note of the fact that Iran continues its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activitiesRECITALMSG, which it is obliged to suspend under several Security Council Resolutions; whereas however the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Treaty as such does not rule out enrichment activities by its state parties and whereas Iran's enrichment program is therefore not in breach with the NPT,

C. Whereas in breach of its obligation under the NPT, Iran has clandestinely constructed an enrichment facility at Fordo close to Qom and only notified the IAEA of its existence long after its construction started; and whereas such secretive approach further undermines the trust in Iranian assurances about the purely civil character of its nuclear programme,

D. Whereas while Iran announced that Fordo will be operational in February and enrich uranium to 20 per cent, Iran has confirmed that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency are expected by the end of January for a one month inspection,

E. Whereas Iran's nuclear program illustrates one of the dangers of the use of nuclear energy as there is no clear line to distinguish military from civil use and hence should progressively be abandoned as source of energy worldwide,

F. Whereas while the value of nuclear weapons as instruments of power becomes exceedingly questionable, the proliferation of nuclear technology thrives and whereas the double standards in the world nuclear control regime risk to make the NPT obsolete,

G. Whereas the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 23 January decided to reinforce sanctions against Iran, banning notably the import, purchase and transport of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products from Iran into the EU while already concluded contracts can still be executed until 1 July 2012, as well as investment in petrochemical companies in Iran; whereas the Council also froze the assets of the Iranian central bank within the EU and banned the delivery of Iranian-denominated banknotes and coinage to the Iranian central bank,

H. Whereas a review of the measures relating to oil and petroleum products will take place before 1 May 2012,

I Whereas the Saudi oil Minister Ali al-Naimi announced on 23 January that his country could increase production by two million barrels to make up for banned Iranian crude oil exports,

J. Whereas a senior commander of the Revolutionary Guard force has been quoted saying that Tehran's leadership has decided to order the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, if the country's petroleum exports are blocked and whereas French and British warships joined a US carrier aircraft group on 22 January 2012 and passed through the Strait of Hormuz,

1. takes act that the European Council has decided on extensive additional sanctions against Iran, banning all imports of oil and petrochemical products as well as any dealings with Iran's Central Bank to take effect after six months and expresses its grave concern as to growing tensions and exchange of threats over Iran's nuclear program;

2. Condemns the obsession of the Iranian government with the development of enrichment technology far beyond the necessities to ensure secure fuel supply for civil purposes and in disrespect of international concerns over clandestine military intentions;

3. However re-iterates its position that a military confrontation has to be avoided by all means; and recalls that <country-region w:st="on"></country-region><place w:st="on"></place>Iran</place><//place></country-region><//country-region> is a member of the NPT - contrary to some states in possession of nuclear weapons - and as such allows for inspections of its acknowledged nuclear installations by the IAEA;

4. Condemns all acts of aggression, murder and provocation, such as the apparently concerted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists with the latest case of Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan and certain unexplained explosions taking place in Iran, as well as the incarceration and sentence to death of foreign citizens by the Iranian security forces for the sake of increasing political pressure like the recent case of American citizen Amir Mirzaei Hekmati;

5. Strongly believes that the Iranian nuclear issue can not be solved militarily and insists that the component of the EU3+3 double track approach, incentives, needs to be emphasized now;

6. urges the E3+3 and Iran to return to the negotiating table and calls on the negotiators to forge a mutually acceptable compromise within the NPT; suggests also to enlarge the negotiation team to include Brazil and Turkey and to initiate negotiations towards a system of mutual security guarantees for all the countries in the region;

7. Suggests for the EU to establish diplomatic representation and an EU delegation in <city w:st="on"></city><place w:st="on"></place>Tehran</place><//place></city><//city> now as a gesture of good will;

8. Underlines its position that sanctions should be targeted in such a way that the measures don't have undue negative consequences for the general population; Insists therefore that the planned review of the new restrictions by the Council before May 2012 should include a thorough analysis of the effects on the Iranian people and that the embargo should be revised in case it causes severe hardship for average Iranians;

9. believes that in countries against which the EU applies restrictive measures, an EU presence on the ground is particularly essential in order to ensure that the Member States, as well as EU Heads of Delegation are closely involved in the process of designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating of restrictive measures and their consequences;

10. Re-iterates its call on the Iranian Parliament and government to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol and to fully implement the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement;

11. Re-iterates its call on all nuclear weapons states to make progressive steps to reduce nuclear warhead numbers, to phase out the role of nuclear weapons in security policy and to decide on concrete targets and a clear timetable towards achieving a nuclear weapon free zone Europe-Middle East;

12. Calls on Iran's leadership and other governments in the region who consider investing in nuclear power, not to repeat the errors of many EU member countries to favour a dangerous, costly and outdated technology; instead appeals to those countries to develop all options of modern renewable energy technologies, efficiency and conservation methods;

13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the EU President, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the UNSC, the Director-General of the IAEA, the governments and parliaments of the Mashreq countries, of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Israel, Palestine, Iraq, Turkey and the Government and Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran.